State of Utah v. Dennis D. Kazda : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Dennis D. Kazda : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven E. Clyde; Attorney for Appellant.
Unknown.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Kazda, No. 14201.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/200
RECEIVED 
LA \V LIBRAR y 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
DENNIS D. KAZDA 
Defendant-Appellant 
BR!GEt~~:~ Y~::r~G L' :·v 
'1 ~·, .::J:J CL:~·:~ le.'// ~,~~ool 
Case No 14201 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Jury Verdict in the Thrid Judicial 
District Court, Tooele County; Honorable Gordon 
R. Hall, Judge 
STEVEN E. CLYDE 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
•, ~,T 1 (' 'l'.-~7:' ( J I,, I _._ , , , .J 
Cle~k. Supreme Court, Utah 
:ATT 
.LAW 
,TREET 
'TY, 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
NATURE OF THE CASE . ..... ~ . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . 1 
DISPOSITION BELOW. . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..••• · .••.•••.••.••.••••.....•..•.. 1 
ARGU.ti,1ENT • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT AN HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT CONSTITUTES AN 
ABSOLUTE STATUTORY DEFENSE TO THEFT, THEREBY 
PREJUDICING THE DEFENDANT, Al~D PREVENTING A FAIR 
AND IMPARTIAL DETERMINATION BY THE JURY ..•.••.••• 11 
POINT II 
THE COURT BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT RECKLESS 
INTENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT UNDER 
76-4-404, ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT ON LESS 
THAN A REASONABLE DOUBT OF A CONSCIENCE OBJECT 
TO DEPRIVE THE OWNER OF ITS PROPERTY .•.......•.•. 32 
STATUTES CITED 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, As amended 
Section 76-6-401 •......•..•.••..•...•.••.......•... 23 
Section 76-6-402 ............•...................... 23,25,29 
76-6-404 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 22 f 23 I 25 f 32 
103-28-5 R.S. Utah 1933 .•.••..•............ 34 33,36 
CASES CITED 
Jordan v. State, 107 Tex.Crim.Rptr. 414,296 SW 585 ...... 22 
People v. Butler, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P 2d 703 ........ 19,34 
People v. Devine, 95 Cal.Rptr. 227, 30 P 378 ............ 22,34 
People v. Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 P 514 .................. 15,33 
People v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 235 NW 770 .......... 22 
Stanley v. State, 61 Okl.Crim.Rptr. 382, 69 P 2d 398 .... 20,30,34 
State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P 2d 84 ................. 16,24,28,29,34 
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P 2d 952 .................. 11,14,25,31,34 
State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 218, 240 P 2d 504 ........... 13,31,34 I 
ATT 
-LAW 
TREET 
TY. 
-~-
State v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P 2d 354, 360 .••. ~ •••.••• 14 
State v. Waid, 92 Utah 279, 92 Utah 279, 97 P 2d 647 .••... 14 
~.ATT 
-LAW 
TREET 
TY. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
DENNIS D. KAZDA, SUPREME COURT NO. 14201 
Defendant - Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLA.~T 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict, which found the Defend-
ant guilty of third-degree felony theft, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Tooele County. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case was tried to a jury on the 12th and 13th day of 
June, 1975 before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge of the 
District Court. The Judge charged the jury with the requested in-
structions, one of which Defendant took exception to, and which is 
the subject of this appeal. The jury returned a verdict finding . j 
the defendant, Dennis D. Kazda, guilty as charged. The Court then 
sentenced the Defendant to serve an indeterminate term of up to 
five years in the Utah State Prison. The Court permitted defendant 
Kazda to serve this sentence concurrently with his present incarce-
ration there fora different and unrelated conviction. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT O~~ APPEAL 
Appellant asks this Court to set aside the jury verdict of 
June 13, 1975, and to grant Appellant new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about September 1, 1974, appellant Kazda met with one 
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Mr. Johnson, whom Kazda believed worked for Mountain Bell Telephone 
Company. Mr. Kazda's belief was based on the fact that Mr. Johnson 
was driving a white El Camino or Ranchero truck with Mountain Bell 
decals on the sides. Mr. Johnson represented to appellant Kazda 
that he was so employed. Mr. Kazda and Mr. Johnson met at a truck 
yard near the Mountain Bell offices on Redwood Road and 21st South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Johnson told Kazda of a pending contract 
bid for the removal of unused telephone lines which were presently 
strung in the Tooele, Rush Valley Area. (T 174). Mr. Kazda, be-
lieving Mr. Johnson's offer of contract to be truthful, accompanied 
Mr. Johnson to the Hogan Ranch in Rush Valley, Tooele County, 
w:1ere Mr. Johnson was going to show him which telephone lines were 
to be cut down. 
Mr. Kazda submitted a written bid to Mr. Johnson for $22.20 
per mile for the removal of these wires. (T 175). On September 26, 
1974, appellant Kazda and Mr. Johnson travelled to the Hogan Ranch 
in Rush Valley, Tooele County. At that time, Mr. Johnson showed 
him which lines were to be removed. (T 176). 
As a result of Mr. Kazda's meeting with Mr. Johnson and the 
subsequent trip to the Hogan Ranch on the 26th, Mr. Johnson pre-
sented a contract to Mr. Kazda which they both signed. Mr. Kazda 
was to remove the designated wires and would be paid $22.20 per 
mile for the removal. This contract is identifed as Defendant's 
Exhibit 24 and was admitted into evidence by the Court. (T 193). 
During this September 26, 1974 trip to the Hogan Ranch, Mr. 
Kazda ·was driving his brown, 4-wheel drive Dodge pickup, which is 
registered and licensed in his name. (T 169). He was accompanied 
by Mr. Johnson from the telephone company. Kazda and Johnson 
I 
I 
surveyed the telephone lines on the Hogan Ranch at which time Mr. 
Johnson pointed out to the Appellant which lines were to be cut 
down. ( T 176) . 
On this same September 26th day while Kazda and Johnson were 
touring the Hogan Ranch, Kazda's truck became stuck in an irrigation 
ditch. At this time the truck was in full view of Mr. Degelback, 
employee of the Hogan Ranch who was the prosecutions first witness 
at trial. Mr. Kazda got out of his truck and went over and spoke 
with Mr. Degelback. (T 18, 19). Kazda asked for permission to 
come onto the Hogan Ranch. He stated that he had a contract from 
Mountain Bell to take down the telephone lines and wanted permission 
to re-enter in order to do so. (T 19, 172). This occurred some 
time during the afternoon of the 26th which Mr. Degelback has pin-
pointed as being between 3:30 and 4:00 P.M. (T 21). 
Believing that he had a valid contract, Kazda hired his 
co-defendants Mr. Reay and Mr. Stockton to help him remove the 
wires. 
On October 1, 1974 defendants Kazda, .Reay and Stockton came 
onto the Hogan Ranch at approximately 8:00 in the morning. They 
entered the Hogan Ranch by the main route from the City of Stockton, 
and proceeded through the main barnyard which goes directly past 
the Hogan's house. Mr. Leland Hogan, a prosecuting witness, saw 
the brown Dodge pickup truck which was later identified as be-
longing to the defendant Kazda on the morning of October 1st. (T 32). 
Mrs. Joyce Hogan the wife of Leland Hogan also saw the truck enter 
the barnyard and drive past the house. She also identified the 
truck as being a brown Dodge 4-wheel drive pickup. She claimed 
,An the Defendants entered the yard at 8:00 in the morning. (T 49). 
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Both Mr. and Mrs. Hogan later observed three individuals, who 
were later identified as defendants Kazda, Reay· and Stockton, 
stopping their truck about 100 yards from the Hogan's house. The 
truck was parked in an open field within full view of the highway 
and the Hogan's home. The Defendants proceeded to cut down the 
telephone wires. 
Leland Hogan was somewhat concerned about the presence of 
these three individuals on his land, and went out of his house and 
observed with a pair of binoculars, their activities. At this 
time all three Defendants were in full view of the house and were 
making no attempt to conceal their activity. (T 34). 
Mrs. Hogan also testified that she observed the Defendants 
cutting down the wires. She indicated however, that she did not 
ever see them load the lines into the truck. (T 51, 54). 
The Defendants continued to cut the wires from the telephone 
poles in full view of Leland Hogan who was standing outside his 
home. Mr. Hogan became suspicious and went into his house to 
telephone the Sheriff. (T 50). While Mr. Hogan was calling the 
Sheriff, Mrs. Hogan continued to observe the Defendants activities. 
Mr. Hogan did call the Sheriff •·s Department (T 32) and the 
Sheriff in turn called the telephone company. Mr. Winchester, a 
Mountain Bell employee, received the call from the Sheriff's office. 
Mr. Winchester and Mr. Manzione who is also a Mountain Bell employ-
ee then went to the Hogan Ranch to investigate. (T 60). Mr. 
Winchester and Mr. Manzione approached from the same route the 
Defendants had used in entering the Hogan Ranch. They entered the 
barnyard, drove past the Hogan's home and spoke to the Hogans 
who were at that time observing the Defendants. Mr. Winchester 
I 
I 
I 
!ATT 
.L.w, 
TREET 
TY. 
-5-
then drove down and spoke with the Defendants. 
When Mr. winchester and Mr. Manzione approached the Defendants, 
they were no longer cutting wires, but were sitting on defendant 
Kazda's truck. One of the Defendants indicated to Mr. Winchester 
that they had a contract to remove the wire, but had stopped be-
cause the wire had fallen against a power line. The Defendants did 
not know how to get the telephone wires away from the hot line. 
Mr. Winchester testified that the Defendants indicated they were 
pleased to see Mr. Winchester and Mr. Manzione. The Defendants 
hoped these telephone company employees would help them remove the 
wires from the power lines. (T 64). 
Mr. Winchester did testify that the Defendants represented to 
him that they had a contract to take the wires from the poles. The 
Defendants however failed to produce a copy of the written contract. 
(T 64) • 
Mr. Winchester was concerned about the validity of the con-
tract and returned to the Hogan's house to use the telephone. Mr. 
Manzione remained behind with the three Defendants. During Mr. 
Winchester's absence the three Defendants were alone with Mr. 
Manzione and the defendant Kazda's 4-wheel drive pickup truck. 
(T 104) . 
While Mr. Winchester was telephoning Salt Lake City, the 
Sheriff's Deputy arrived on the scene. Deputy Park asked the 
Defendants what they were doing on the Hogan Ranch. They responded 
that they had a contract to remove the wire and were doing so. 
Deputy Park asked the individuals for an identification which they 
readily produced. (T 101, 105, 144). 
A second deputy came, Wayne Jones who testified for tl:le 
~ATT 
-LAW 
TREET 
TY. 
-6-
prosecution, arrived on the scene. He joined Deputy Park and 
waited for Mr. Winchester to return with information of the 
contract from Salt Lake City. When Mr. Winchester returned and 
said Mountain Bell had no record of any contract with Mr. Kazda, 
Deputies Jones and Park arrested all three of the Defendants. 
(T 114) . 
Therefore, in all encounters with the prosecutions witnesses 
defendant Kazda indicated that he had a valid contract with Mountain 
Bell for the removal of these telephone wires. He indicated he had 
been told by Mr. Johnson which of these wires he was to cut down. 
(T 176). Mr. Johnson is the individual with whom Mr. Kazda con-
tracted for the removal of the wire. Kazda testified that Mr. 
Johnson went with him to the Hogan Ranch and showed him which ,vires 
he was to cut down. (T 172). Defendant Kazda testified Mr. Johnson 
was with him on the day he spoke with Mr. Degelback and that he 
knew which wires to cut down because Mr. Johnson had shown him. 
(T 176). 
Mr. Winchester testified that there is no way with the naked 
eye to distinguish which lines were or were not in service at the 
time the Defendants were cutting them down. (T 82). Winchester 
testified that an individual must either have had access to 
Mountain Bell's records or have testing equipment with them in the 
field. Winchester testified that this testing equipment is avail-
able to the public, but stated the Defendants did not have any 
testing equipment with them at the time of their arrest. (T 81). 
He further testified that Mountain Bell's records which would 
indicate which lines are in service are available only to Mountain 
.Bell employees. (T 82). Defendant Kazda is not nor has he ever 
I 
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been an employee of Mountain Bell. 
Therefore, it must be assumed that Mr. Johnson existed. That 
he was in fact an employee of Mountain Bell and that he had access 
to Mountain Bell's service records. That on the 26th day of 
September, 1974, Mr. Johnson did accompany defendant Kazda to the 
Hogan Ranch and told Kazda which wires were out of service and 
should be removed. 
There were approximately twelve telephone lines on the poles 
involved on that day. Six of those twelve lines were in service. I 
Mr. Winchester identified those lines as nos. 7, 8, 5, 6, 3 and 4. 
(T 73). He testified that lines no. 9, 10, 1, 2, 17 and 18 were I 
not in service, and that these were the only lines which had been 
cut by the Defendants. (T 74, 81). 
Defendant Kazda took the stand in his own behalf. He testified 
that he openly entered the ranch property during the daylight 
hours, spoke openly on September 26th to Mr. Degelback. His 
identity was not concealed in any way. He drove his own truck 
to the Hogan property which is licensed and registered in his own 
name. (T 169). Kazda testified that he again entered the property 
about 8:00 A.M. on October 1, 1974 for the purpose of removing the 
wire under the alleged contract. Defendant Kazda indicated he was 
aware of people on the ranch. He saw cars parked around the yard 
and assumed that people were present. (T 191) . 
At no time on October 1st, did any of the witnesses observe 
any of the Defendants attempt to leave the area, even though the 
Defendants had a 4-wheel drive vehicle and knew of another exist, 
(T 172, 113), which would have taken them safely away from the 
approaching telephone truck. All witnesses testified that defendant 
I 
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Kazda and his companions were working in an open field which was 
clearly visible from the road. Kazda testified that he had clear 
vision of the road and could see any approaching vehicle for some 
distance. (T 172). Even with this clear view of the highway, the 
Defendant did not attempt to leave the area when they saw the 
telephone truck approaching. This is verified by the testimony of 
Leland Hogan. (T 54, 55). Defendant Kazda testified on the stand 
that he observed the approaching telephone truck long before its 
arrival. Nevertheless, he did not attempt to leave the area, 
(T 185), even though he knew of another exist. (T 185). 
Mr. Winchester, the telephone company employee testified that 
none of the Defen~nts atte~ted to leave the area. (T 78,183). I 
Mr. Manzione, also a telephone company employee was left alone with 
the three Defendants ~ile Winchester made his call to Salt Lake 1 
City. Manzione testified that none of the three Defendants attempt-
ed to overpower him or leave, even though they had a 4-wheel drive 
vehicle and knew of an escape route. (T 104, 183, 184) • I 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Defendant 
intended to cut and remove the wire from the Hogan Ranch. In fact, 
defendant Kazda himself testified that he was suppose to cut the 
wier down and simply leave it on the ground for Mountain Bell. 
He believed Mr. Johnson was going to come along, coil up the wire 
and take it back for reuse. (T 18, 19). The States witnesses who 
observed the Defendants cutting the wire down, testified that they 
never saw the Defendants coil the wire or attempt to load it into 
his truck. No witnesses saw any spools in the truck or any 
mechanism which would have aided in the coiling and removal of the 
wire. (T 47, 51, 54). 
I 
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Leland Hogan testified that he never saw the Defendants load 
the wire or ta.ke it away. ('1' 47) • Witness Joyce Hogan testified 
similarly. She observed the Defendants cut the wire and drag it 
along the ground, but never saw them place it in the truck. (T 51, 
54). Mr. Winchester testified that he observed no spools for the 
coiling of wire, and saw no wire in the bed of the truck. In fact, 
he testified that the lines were still hanging from the poles. 
(T 78, 79). Deputy Jones testified that there were no wires in 
the truck. He further testified that the telephone company employ-
ees in fact had to climb the poles and cut the wire down themselves. 
(T 116). Defendant Kazda testified himself that once the wire was 
cut he was to leave it for Mountain Bell to pick up. (T 186). 
Therefore, he did not intend to take the wire with him. He had-no 
spool on which to coil the wire. He had no mechanism to aid in its 
removal from the area. (T 186). 
The validity, and even existence of the contract which defend-
ant Kazda claims he has is somewhat in question. Mr. Winchester 
of Mountain Bell testified on (T 58) that whenever lines are to 
be removed from Mountain Bell's poles, that it is either done by 
the telephone company itself or by private contractors. He stated 
that if private contracts are let, that he himself would have the 
I 
I 
information concerning when, where and who. (T 57, 58). Winchester 
further testified that when private contracts have been let, that I 
he is given a copy of that contract. (T 58, 59). Winchester further 
testified that when he telephoned Salt Lake City on October 1st to 
confirm Defendants contract, Mountain Bell had no records of any 
contract with the Defendant. (T 65). 
Mr. Winchester testified on cross-examination however, that if 
I 
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an u.,.~authorized contract was issued for the removal of wires to a 
private individQal, that he would have no notice or record of it 
whatsoever. (T 76). 
The fact that the Defendants only cut those lines which were 
not in service lends validity to Defendants belief that a valid 
contract existed. Kazda testified that Mr. Johnson accompanied 
him to the Hogan Ranch on September 26th. (T 176). Mr. Johnson 
at that time pointed out those wires which were to be removed. 
Mr. Winchester testified that the wires which were cut by the 
Defendants were all out of service. No in service lines were 
disturbed. (T 74, 81, 82). Winchester further testified that with-
out testing equipment a person must have had access to Mountain 
. 
Bell's records in order to know which lines were not in service. 
(T 82). He also stated that only Mountain Bell employees have 
access to these records. Defendant Kazda was not a Mountain Bell 
employee. 
Defendant Kazda testified that the extent of his formal educa-
tion was the eleventh grade; junior year in high school. He does 
not have a high school diploma. (T 168). He is therefore a man 
of little formal education. He is not likely to be aware of any 
formal contracting procedures which a large corporation might 
employ. He based his belief on the contract's validity upon the 
representations made to him by Mr. Johnson, whom he believed worked 
for Mountain Bell. Defendant Kazda reasonably believed that he 
had a valid contract. 
On October 1, 19 7 4, defendant Kazda who is the Appellant here 
and Mr. Reay and Mr. Stockton were arrested by the Tooele County 
Sheriff. They were charged and tried for the crime of third-degree 
I 
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felony theft. Defendant Kazda was convicted on this charge. His 
co-defendant Mr. Stockton was acquitted. Appellant Kazda was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0-5 years in the Utah State 
Penitentiary. It is from this conviction that the Appellant appeals . 
. POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN HONEST 
MISTAKE OF FACT CONSTITUTES AN ABSOLUTE STATUTORY DEFENSE TO 
THEFT, THEREBY PREJUDICING THE DEFENDANT, AND PREVENTING A FAIR 
A!~D IMPARTIAL DETERMINATION BY THE JURY. 
It is a well recognized general rule that things which are I 
not excepted to at trial and instructions which are not requested 
to be given may not later be raised as grounds for appeal. The I 
Supreme Court will generally not take notice of them where exception 
was not made at trial. There is a generally recognized exception 
to the above stated rule which is applied in many jurisdictions. 
Those courts will take notice of error which exists on the records 
in many criminal cases involving capital offenses or other serious 
offenses involving long term imprisonment. The error which must· 
exist on the record must be so manifestly prejudicial to the 
Defendant that it denied him his fundamental rights of a fair 
trial and prevented the jury from making a fair and impartial 
determination of the facts and evidence. The Court may notice such 
error even though they were not made a ground for appeal by taking 
exception to them at trial. The Utah Supreme Court follows this 
general exception. 
In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952, the Defendant Cobo 
was charged and tried for murder and the jury convicted the 
Defendant of voluntary manslaughter. The Defendant and the deceased 
were drinking in the Defendants home and the Defendant asked the 
deceased to leave. The deceased did leave, and obtain more liquor 
I 
I 
RATT 
r.LAW 
S:TRE::.7 
ITY. 
II 
-.1.L;-
and return to the Defendants home. He pounded on the door and Cobo 
stepped out onto the porch where he confronted the deceased. They 
engaged in a fist fight. The Defendant struck the deceased several 
times in the head and the deceased fell dead. Medical examination 
indicated that he died from a subdural hemorrhage. The Defendant 
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a crime which involves 
as a necessary element a specific intent to kill. 
The Court in its charge to the jury made no mention whatsoever 
of the necessary element of intent to kill which must exist in order 
to convict of voluntary manslaughter. No exception was taken by 
counsel for the Defendant at trial to the giving of these instruc-
tions. However, it was excepted to on appeal. In this regard, 
t~e Court stated as follows: 
"We recognize the well settled general rule in this and 
other jurisdictions that alleged errors with respect to 
instructions and in refusing a request to instruct or-
dinarily will not on appeal be considered or reviewed unless 
sufficient exceptions were taken in the Court below by 
the party aggrieved. Such rule however is not uniform as 
to all errors so committed. In many jurisdictions there 
are well recognized exceptions to the general rule especia-
lly in criminal cases involving capital offenses or other 
grave and serious offenses of long term imprisonment, and 
sometimes has been applied even in civil cases, where 
papable error on the face of the record involved vio-
lations of fundamental rights and privileges of manifest 
prejudice to the party aggrieved." (Citations admitted). 
The Court having recognized the general rule, stated that it 
would apply the stated exception in: 
11 
••• capital cases and in cases of grave and serious 
charged offenses and convictions of long terms of 
imprisonment, cases involving the life and liberty of 
the citizen, we think that when papable errors made to 
appear on the face of the record and to the manifest 
prejudice of the accused, the Court has the power to 
notice such error and to correct the same, though no 
formal exception was taken to the ruling." 
The Court then stated that they had already considered the 
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elements of voluntary manslaughter and that one of the essential 
elements was the willful or intentional killing of the deceased. 
The Court then stated the charge to the jury wholly eliminated 
this essential element. It allowed the jury to convict the 
Defendant without finding that the killing was either willful or 
intentional. Thus the jury was misdirected and convicted the 
Defendant on less than the required evidence. 
In reversing the Court stated: 
"That such error was manifest and of necessity resulted 
to the prejudice of the accused and deprived him of a 
fair trial cannot well be doubted. Because of such 
manifest error and further because, as already indicated, 
that the judgment of the Court below must be reversed, 
and a new trial granted upon other grounds, we deem it our 
duty to notice t~e error and to correct it, since no 
exception was taken thereto, in order that on a retrial 
of the case the same error may not again be committed." 
Thus, the Court held that where the instructions given failed 
to include an essential element of the crime and that this failure 
worked such a total prejudice to the Defendant that if followed. by 
the jury it would prevent a fair and proper disposition of the case, 
that the Court must notice the error even though exception was not 
taken at trial. Where such prejudice is found, a reversal of the 
conviction and a new trial is mandated. 
The Utah Supreme Court again followed this rule in State v. 
Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504 (1952). Here, the Def~ndant 
was charged with larceny and was convicted by a jury of that crime. 
The Defendant took the stand in his own defense and upon cross-
examination testified of previous felony convictions. The Trial 
Court failed to instruct the jury that such testimony bore only on 
Defendants credibility as a witness, and not on hisculpable conduct. 
However, Defendants counsel failed to take exception to the failure 
I 
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of the Court to so instruct. 
The Supreme Court noted the well recognized rule that exceptions 
to instructions not taken at trial will not be reviewed by the 
Court. The Court however noted the well known exception as stated 
in State vs. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P. 2d 354, 360: 
"Having approved the instructions as given and requested 
no others, counsel· should not be heard to complain that 
the Court did not constitue itself counsel in the cause, 
and submit other theories not urged by the Defendant 
just because the Court may think such theories of defense 
could have been urged. It is the Courts duty to try 
the issue made by the parties and not to make the case 
for them. We have held that where instructions are 
palably erroneous to such an extent that they would, if 
followed by the jury, prevent a fair and proper determin-
ation of the issues, we may notice the error without ex-
ception having been taken. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 
60 P. 2d 952; State v. Waid-, 92 Utah 279, 92 Utah 279, 
97 P. 2d 647. But we are aware of no holding that the 
mere failure to given instruction which might have been 
given, but which was not requested or called to the 
attention of the Court, and no exception taken to the 
failure to give it will be noticed on appeal." 
Thus, the Court held that it is not to play the part of defense 
counsel in the case and will not submit mere defense theories simply 
because the Court feels such theories could have been urged by 
defense counsel at trial. The Court noted however, that where the 
failure to give such instructions would prejudice the case to the 
extent that if followed by the jury it would prevent a fair and 
impartial determination of the issues that the Court may notice the 
error even without exception having been taken at trial. 
Here, the Court felt there was no such prejudice and affirmed 
the Trial Court. 
Thus, the rule in Utah is that the Court will not assume the 
role of advocate. The Court will not assert mere theories of 
defense which could have been asserted at trial, nor will the Court 
take notice on appeal of errors which were not excepted to a trial. 
I . 
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There is an exception to the rule state above which the Utah 
Supreme Court has followed. That is where counsel fails to have 
the jury so charged or the failure of counsel to take exception 
to an instruction which was so erroneous that the effect would 
allow the jury to convict without finding the existence of all the 
essential elements of a crime, then the Court may take notice even 
without exception having been taken at trial. 
Very early in the history of the Utah territory, the territor-
ial Supreme Court applied the Common Law Rule that absent an intent 
to steal, a conviction of larceny may not be sustained. The Court 
also applied the common law defense that an honest mistake in 
point of fact negates the necessary intent to steal, and therefore 
a conviction of larceny may not be sustained. 
In People vs. Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 Pac. 514 (1886), the 
Defendant was convicted of larceny. At trial, evidence was intro-
duced which established that the Defendant took the property .in 
question under a mistaken belief of title in himself thereto. 
Defense counsel asked the Court to charge the jury as follov1s: 
"If the jury believed from the evidence that the De-
fendant took this property under color of right, and in 
good faith, believing it to be his property, there should 
be a verdict of not guilty, although it may afterwards 
turn out, and though the jury may believe it to be a 
fact, that the property belonged to Frederick Berg." 
The Court refused to give this instruction and in its stead 
charged the jury as follows: 
"That if you find that he afterwards discovered it to 
be the property of Frederick Berg, and, after knowledge 
that it was Frederick Berg's property, that he still 
retained it, then, of course he would be guilty." 
The jury convicted the Defendant. Defense counsel took 
exception to the charge as given • 
I 
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The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict, stating that the 
charge to the jury was erroneous. In so holding, the Court stated: 
"It is an elementary principle that ignorance or 
mistaken point of fact is, in all cases of supposed 
offense, a sufficient excuse. (Citation omitted). In 
order to convict of larceny, the jury must be satisfied th-
at the taking of the property was with a felonious 
intent. It is not sufficient to find that, after the 
taking, it was converted to the uses of Defendant, with a 
felonious intent. It is necessary to find that the intent 
to steal existed at the time of the taking. No subsequent 
felonious intent will suffice.« 
Therefore, the Court held that a mistaken belief 1n fact, 
if honestly believed by the Defendant to be true will negate felon-
ious intent. Absent an intent to steal there is no larceny. 
Therefore, since the Court had failed to instruct the jury adequately 
on the necessary element of intent, and the excuse of mistake in 
fact, it ordered a reversal. 
In State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84 (1920) the Defendant 
was charged with the crime of grand larceny under the old Utah 
Criminal's Cr.de and was convicted by a jury and sentenced to a term 
not exceeding ten years in the Utah State Prison. The facts 
introduced at trial showed that Defendant and his brother operated 
a ranch which was comprised of 20,000 acres of unfenced lands. 
The Defendant generally used his land for the grazing of sheep. 
The land was generally arid and the only water obtainable for 
watering his sheep was from a spring on the Defendants land. The 
Defendant constructed cement watering troughs at the spring where 
his sheep could obtain water. 
A large band of horses roamed on the open range and also in 
need of water came to Defendants watering troughs for that purpose. 
The horses would run towards the water and would trample Defendants 
rnE~T sheep, killing his lambs. The horses were continually grazing on 
TY, 
I 
I 
~ 
IATT 
LAW 
iY, 
-17-
the Defendants grass needed for his sheep. 
Defendant and some of his employees rounded up these horses 
culled out those baring brands and turned them loose. · Those animals 
remaining were driven by Defendant and his employees into a ravine 
where they were shot and killed. Defendant admitted at trial having 
taken and killed these horses, but denied having any knowledge of 
them being owned by anyone else. And he denied having any intent 
to steal. Defendant thought these horses were wild and that they 
were killing his sheep and damaging his property and therefo:re, 
he felt he had a right to destroy them. 
It turned out the horses did in fact belong to others and 
these individuals filed a complaint charging Defendant with stealing 
their horses. Defendant was convicted of larceny. 
The Court noted that in order to convict for grand larceny 
under our statutes, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the taking was with a felonious intent. That means there 
must have been an intent to steal the property in question and 
that such an intent must have existed at the time of taking of the 
property. 
The Court reviewed.the record and stated that it was unable 
to find any evidence which would support a finding that Defendant 
intended to steal any of the horses. Defendant openly and re-
peatedly declared his purpose and intention in coralling and 
shooting the horses. His acts and conduct were in strict harmony 
with such express purpose and intention. 
The Court noted a well recognized rule that the jury is not 
bound to believe what the accused may say concerning his motives, 
his purpose or his intentions. It is the province of the jury 
!ATT 
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to determine such intentions based on the facts presented at trial. 
The Court then stated: 
"When, however, as here, the accused has openly, 
repeatedly, and explicitly declared his purpose and 
intention respecting the act in question, and his 
declarations are not only not in conflict with the 
manner in which the act was done, but are in strict 
harmony and conformance therewith., may a jury say that 
his intentions and purposes are not what his declarations 
and acts indicate them to have been? While it is true t.'-1e 
jury is not bound by the statements of the witness 
respecting the purpose and intention of the accused and 
that they may find that the real purpose and intention 
of the accused were not as stated, yet there is a 
limit beyond which a jury may not go." 
The Court stated that in order to convict for a felony under 
the laws of Utah, there must exist at tht time the crime is 
committed a union or joint operation of the act and the intent .. 
There must exist in the mind of the individual the intent to do 
the prohibited act with which he is charged. Therefore, he may 
not be convicted of larceny unless there is a showing that he 
intended to steal. 
The Court found the Defendants purposes of coralling and 
killing the horses was undoubtedly unlawful, but the Court states 
that intent to steal may not be inferred from the unlawful act 
alone. The Court stated: 
"The evidence in this case leaves no room for dispute, 
or doubt even, that the only prupose and intention of 
the Defendant was to take the horses in order to destroy 
them. That being so, the jury cannot legally find him 
guilty of larceny, and this Court not only has the power, 
but it has its duty, to set aside the verdict and judg-
ment based thereon. 11 . 
The Court thus held that where Defendant had taken the property 
of another under a mistaken claim of rights that he could not be 
convicted of the crime of larceny for the reason that if this 
-LAw mistaken belief of fact proved to be as he believed it to be, there 
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was no intent to steal. Defendant believed the horses belonged 
to no one. They were damaging his property and he felt he had a 
right to destroy them in order to save his property. Thus, this 
mistaken belief or a claim of right to the property, negatived. 
the necessary criminal intent to steal. The Court felt justified 
in reversing and granting a new trial. 
The courts of other jurisdictions have also followed this 
rule. 
In People v. Butler, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 421 P. 2d 703, the 
Defendant was convicted in a Los Angeles County Court of first-
degree felony murder and of assault with a deadly weapon. The 
Defendant had been employed by the deceased and went to the 
deceased's home in order to be paid for his services. The 
decedent refused to pay the Defendant and pulled a gun on the 
Defendant and threatened to use it. The Defendant in turn pulled 
his own gun. They struggled, and the decedent was shot and 
killed. 
The Defendant honestly believing he was entitled to money 
due and owing, took the decedent's wallet and left the premises. 
Defendant was charged with robbery, and because the decedent had 
died, with felony murder. 
In reversing the conviction Justice Traynor stated that robbery 
is but larceny aggrevated by the use of force or fear to accomplish 
the taking of the property. The Court then stated: 
"The felonious intent requisite to robbery is the same 
intent common to those offenses that, like larceny, 
were grouped in the penil code designation of theft. 
The taking of property is not theft in the absence of 
an intent to steal, and a specific intent to steal 1.· e . . , 
an intent to deprive an owner permanently of this 
property is an essential element of robbery." 
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The Court noted that an intent to steal may in some instances 
be inferred by the conduct of the Defendant. The Court also noted 
however, that proof of an existence of the state of mind which 
is incompatible with an intent to steal will preclude a fining 
of either theft or robbery. In this regard, Justice Traynor 
said: 
"It has long been the rule in this State and generally 
throughout the country that a bonafied belief, even 
though mistakenly held, that one has a right or a claim 
to the property negates felonious intent.n (Citations 
omitted). 
The Defendants only defense to the robbery murder was the 
existence of an honest belief that he was entitled to the money. 
The Trial Court in approving the prosecutor's argument that no 
such defense existed removed completely from the consideration of 
the jury credible and substantial evidence which would have 
precluded a finding that Defendant had an intent to steal. The 
Court therefore held that the Defendant has a constitutional right 
to have every significant fact determined by a jury. The denial 
of this right was a miscarriage of justice and the California 
constitution therefore required a reversal. 
The courts have also held that felonious intent may be 
negated where the taking is open or in the presence of friends. 
Where there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property and 
no denial of the conduct in which the Defendant seeks to engage, 
and where possession is not obtained by force or stelth, a 
presumption of no felonious intent is raised, which must be 
rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that felonious intent 
existed. 
In Stanley v. State, 69 P. 2d 398 (1937 Okl.) the Defendant 
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was charged with a larceny of one black sow and five black and red 
spotted shoats which the evidence showed belonged to another. The 
sow and her young had for some period of time ranged over the 
Defendants land and had mingled with the Defendants own pigs. 
The brand-markings in the ears of the sow involved were similar 
to those of the Defendants own stock. 
The Defendant enlisted the aid of several of his neighbors 
to round up the sow and shoats. He declared to them on several 
occasions that his intention was to capture and butcher the hogs. 
The Defendant made no attempt to conceal his intention to 
capture and kill the pigs. In fact he declared his intention 
to his neighbors repeatedly. They all had a clear opportunity 
to view the pigs and perceive their true ownership. Only after 
. the pigs were butchered did the true owner step fo:r.ward and claim 
title to them. When the Defendants refused to turn over the meat 
or pay the owner for them was he charged with larceny. The Court 
stated that the evidence clearlyshowed the Defendant claimed the 
hogs to be his and that he had a right to butcher them. There was 
not one word of testimony which would indicate any attempt on the 
Defendant's part to coneal the hogs or the butchering of them. They 
were caught in a neighbors yard and penned there in daylight 
hours. There was no attempt to deceive or conceal what was being 
done to the hogs. In fact, all the testimony went to the affect 
that the Defendant either butchered his own hogs or believed that 
he was butchering his own hogs, even though they may have belonged 
to another. He did this in full view and in the presence of his 
friends. 
The Court therefore held that the evidence for the State 
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failed to show criminal intent which must operate jointly with the 
act to constitute larceny. 
In so holding, the Court stated: 
"It has been held universally by the courts not only in 
this state but in other states, that, where the taking 
is open and in the presence of friends, and there is 
no subsequent attempt to conceal the property, and no 
denial, and where possession is not obtained by force, 
trickery, or stratagem, a strict presumption of fact 
arises that there was no felonious intent which must 
be repelled by clear and convincing evidence before a 
jury may legitimately infer a felonious intent. 
The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to 
show the necessary elements of the offense charge. 
We therefore do not hesitate to say the judgment of 
conviction should be reversed.". 
In accord, see People v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227, 30 P. 378; 
Jordon v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. Rptr. 414, 296 SW 585; and People 
v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 255 NW 770 (1934). 
The general rule which is uniformly applied by the courts is 
that in order to convict for the crime of theft (which under 
76-6-404 includes larceny) the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that all elements of the crime exist. The State must prove 
that the unlawful act occur.red and that this unlawful act was 
accornpari.ied by a felonious inten-c. to steal. The felonious intent 
must have existed at the time the act was committed. Where the 
necessary element of intent is missing a conviction of theft or 
larceny may not be sustained. The courts have uniformly held that 
an honest mistake in fact even though totally unreasonable is 
sufficient to negate criminal intent. Similarly the courts have 
held that when the Defendant has openly and repeatedly declared 
his intention and has acted in accordance with his stated intention 
and has made no attempt to conceal his activity nor to deceive, that 
;rnEET this raises a factual presumption of a claim of right which 
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negates criminal intent. Such a presumption is rebutable, but it 
must be rebuted by evidence which tends to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that criminal intent did in fact exist at the time of the 
taking. 
Utah has codified this common law rule in 1973 and is contained 
in u.c.A. 76-4-402 (3} which provides as follows: 
"It is a defense under this part that the actor: ( a) 
acted under a claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or (b) acted in an honest belief that he had 
a right to obtain or exercise control over the property 
or service as he did; or (c) obtained or exercised 
control over the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have consented." 
The existence of any one of these honest but mistaken claims 
of right is an absolute statutory defense to the crime of theft 
under 76-4-404. Where any of these above stated elements can be 
proven by facts introduced at trial, a conviction of theft under 
the Utah Statute may not be sustained. 
The Defendant Kazda was charged with a crime of theft under 
76-6-404 U.C.A. 1953. He was convicted by a jury in the Third 
District Court, for Tooele County, on June 13, 1975. 
Under the new Utah Criminal Code the person commits theft 
when: "he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof." 
76-4-404. The necessary elements of theft are therefore the 
act of obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over property 
which belongs to another person coupled with the intent to pur-
posefully deprive the rightful owner of that property. 
The Utah Statute defines purpose to deprive as follows: 
76-6-401 ( 3) : 
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"This means to have the co::1science object: (a) to withhold 
property permanently or for so extended a period or to 
use under such circumstances that a substantial portion 
of its economic value or of the use and benefit thereof 
will be· lost; or (b) to restore the property only upon. 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or (c) to 
dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it." 
Thus, in order to deprive a person permanently of his 
property the taker must have had the conscience object to steal 
the property. You must therefore have had the intent to steal 
and this is a necessary element of the crime of theft. Absent 
and intent to steal there is no theft and a conviction may not be 
sustained. 
The law in the majority of jurisdictions and in the State of 
Utah is that criminal intent may be negated in two ways. One, 
by the showing of an honest but mistaken belief in fact which tends 
to nega·te criminal intent. This rule was codified by the Utah 
Legislature in 1973 and is now found in U.C.A. 76-6-402 (3). 
Second, where the taking is open and in the presence of friends, and 
there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property or his 
activities concerning that property, and where possession of that. 
property was not obtained by force, a strict presumption of fact 
arises that there was no felonious intent. And where the actor 
has declared his intentions concerning the property and his actions 
conform thereto a jury is obligated to believe the Defendants 
declarations of intentions; State v. Allen, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that it may notice error 
W1'1ich exis·ts on the record which blatantly prejudices the Defendant, 
even though no exception was made at trial by defense counsel. This 
is an exception to the general rule and C"le Court will o!lly apply 
it in those criminal and some civil cases w~1ere the fundamental 
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rights of liberties of the individual are at stake. Thus, where 
the Trial Court failed to instruct the jury concerning a necessary 
element of the crime charged or a defense thereto which was so hla-
tant on the record and which allowed the jury to convict without 
giving a fair and impartial determination to all the fact, the 
court has a duty to notice such error and reverse and remand 
for a new trial; State v. Cobo, supra. 
At trial, defense counsel failed to request an instruction by 
the Court to the effect that an honest, even though unreasonable 
or mistaken belief, of a claim of right to the property involved, 
constitutes an absolute statutory defense to the crime of theft 
under 76-4-404 and 76-6-402 (3). The Court failed to so instruct 
on its own. The overall effect of this failure to so c~arge the 
jury worked a manifest prejudice to the Defendant. The Defendant 
was convicted and sentenced to a five year term in the Utah State 
Penitentiary. The conviction was based on facts introduced at 
trial which clearly established that the Defendant acted with an 
honest belief that he had a contract, and the right to exercise 
control over the property involved. The Defendants honest belief, 
even though unreasonably and mistakenly held, is sufficient to 
negate criminal intent and therefore constitutes an absolute defense 
to the charge of theft. 
Here, Defendant Kennis Kazda entered into what he believed 
to be a valid contract with a man he believed ,:.-,orked for Mountain 
Bell Telephone. Mr. Johnson, the man with whom Kazda contracted 
represented to the Defendant that he worked for Mountain Bell. 
The Defendant observed Mr. Johnson driving a Mountain Bell truck. 
Therefore, he could have reasonably believed that Mr. Johnson was 
I 
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employed by Mountain Bell. 
Under the terms of the contract entered into, defendant Kazda 
was to remove specific wires in the Tooele, Rush Valley Area, which 
were at that time not in service. Defendant Kazda and Mr. Johnson 
entered the boundaries of the Hogan Ranch on September 26, 1974. 
At that time Mr. Johnson preceded to show the Defendant which wires 
were in fact not in service and therefore should be cut down. In 
the course of surveying the Hogan property defendant Kazda's truck 
became stuck in an irrigation ditch in full view of Mr. Degelback, 
a Hogan Ranch employee. The Defendant approached Mr. Degelback who 
was the State's first witness at trial and at that time told_ :him of 
his contract for the removal of the wires. The Defendant sought 
Mr. Degelback's permission to re-enter the Hogan Ranch and remove the 
wires. At that time the Defendant and Mr. Degelback were face to 
face in conversation. The Defendant made no attempt to conceal his 
identity nor was there any attempt by the Defendant to deceive 
Mr. Degelback as to his reason for being on the Hogan property. 
He openly stated that he had a contract and was seeking permission 
to come onto the Hogan land to remove the wire. 
On October 1st the Defendant and his two co-defendants Mr. 
Reay and Mr. Stockton did come onto the Hogan premises. They 
entered in the daylight hours and drove Kazda's own truck within 
full view of the Hogan home. They parked the truck in an open 
field not far from the Hogan home and proceeded to cut down the 
wires. These actions were instruct accordance with the Defendants 
stated declaration to Mr. Degelback, that they had a contract for 
the removal of the wires. The Defendants at all times were within 
r.L ... w full view of t~1e highway where anyone on that road could have seen 
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their actions. They were also in full view of the Hogan home and 
Mr. Leland Hogan and his wife, Joyce Hogan both testified to the 
fact that they observed the Defendants cutting down the wires. 
Later, when Mountain Bell Telephone Company representatives 
arrived on the scene the Defendants again declared that they had 
a contract for the removal of the wire. Defendant Kazda testified 
that he observed the approaching telephone truck from a long 
distance away. He further testified that he knew of an escape 
route which would have taken him safely away from the telephone 
company men.. Nevertheless, the Defendant and his two companions 
did not attempt to leave the area. They had no reason to leave 
the area. The Defendant believed he had a valid contract. In 
fact, the telephone representatives testified at trial, that the 
Defendants expressed their relief at seeing the telpho!le company 
men. The telephone lines which the Defendants were cutting down 
had become entangled on hot power lines. The Defendants hoped 
the telephone company employees would help them remove these lines 
from the power line. 
The defendant Kazda was so confident that he had a contract 
he did not even attempt to flee when Mr. Winchester, Mountain Bell's 
representative left the three Defendants with Mr. Manzione and went 
to the Hogan home to telephone Salt Lake City in order to 
confirm the validity of the contract. The three Defendants were 
with a single man and could easily have overpowered him and left 
the area in the Defendants 4-wheel drive pickup truck, but they 
did not do this. Instead they remained feeling they had done 
nothing wrong. 
Later, when the police deputies arrived, all three Defendants 
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again represented that they had a contract and readily produced 
identification to the police at their request. Again, there 
was no attempt to conceal their activities or their identity. 
There was no attempt to flee the area. The Defendants had no need , 
to flee the area, because they honestly believed they had a valid 
contract for the removal of these wires. In all encounters with 
the prosecution's witnesses the Defendant openly declared that he 
had a contract to remove these wires. All of his actions were in 
conformance with his stated declaration. 
The jury is, of course, entitled to believe or disbelieve 
the Defendant's testimony and weight it evely with that of any 
other witness testifying at the trial. The jury need not accor~ 
the Defendant's testimony any greater weight than they would any 
other witness. Nor is the jury obligated to believe the Defendant's 
statements or declarations of his intent. But as the Court said in 
State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84: 
11 When, however, as here the accused has openly, 
repeatedly, and explicitly declared his purpose and 
intention respecting the acting question, and his 
declarations are not only not in conflict with the 
manner in which the act was done, but are in 
strict harmony and conformity therewith, may a jury 
say that his intention and purpose are not what his 
declarations and acts indicate them to have been? 11 
The Court then stated: 
"While it is true that the jury is not bound by the 
statements of a witness representing the purpose and 
intentions of the accused and that they may find that 
the real purpose and intention of the accused were not 
as stated, yet there is a limit beyond which a jury 
may not go.n 
Here the Defendant openly represented to everyone that he had 
a valid and binding contract for the removal of telephone wires: 
He made no attempt to conceal his identity or to conceal or deceive 
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anyone in regards to the activities in which he sought to engage. 
Thus, his actions were in strict conformance with his stated 
declaration. In light of these facts, the jury may not totally 
disregard the Defendant's stated declarations of his intentions. 
The evidence therefore tends to go against the State's con-
tention that the Defendant had the conscience object to deprive 
Mountain Bell of their wire at the time he cut it down. To the 
contrary, the evidence indicates the Defendant acted under an honest, 
but mistaken belief that he had a valid and binding contract. Al,l 
of his actions are in conformance with this stated belief. Under 
Utah Law, an honest mistaken fact is an absolute statutory defense 
to the crime of theft. 76-6-402 (3). Under Uta.>i Law, in order to 
convict of the crime of theft, the State must prove all of the 
necessary elements of the crime existed at the time of the taking. 
The State must show the Defendant had the intent to steal the 
property at the time he cut the wires down. Even though the taking. 
of the property itself may have been unlawful, if the felonious 
intent to steal is absent at the time of taking there has been no 
theft; State v~ Allen, supra. 
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The law clearly states that a mistaken fact if honestly believed, 
even if totally unreasonable, is sufficient to negate criminal 
' ; intent. It has also beeen universally held that where the taking 
is open and in the presence of friends and in conformance with the 
stated declarations of the accused and there is no subsequent 
attempt to conceal the property and no denial of the taking, and 
possession is not obtained by force, that a strict presumption of 
fact arises that there was no felonious intent. This presumption 
must be repelled by evidence which proves beyond a reasonable 
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doubt that a felonious intent in fact did exist; Stanley v. State, 
supra. 
The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to show the 
necessary elements of criminal intent. To the contrary, all of 
the evidence indicates that the Defendant mistakenly and honestly 
believed that he had a valid and binding contract. Acting upon this 
mistaken belief, he enlisted the aid of two companions and proceeded 
to the Hogan premises where they cut down the wires. The Defendant 
openly decla=d that he had a cnntract to all iliose in which he I 
came in contact. He did not attemp to conceal his activities nor 
did he deny the fact that he had cut down the wire. The Defendant 
made no attempt to remove the wire from the Hogan premises. In 
fact, the Defendant testified that he was to leave the wire there 
and Mountain Bell would pick :J_t up at a later time. No witness 
for the State indicated that they observed any wire in the truck 
of the Defendant. None of the State's witnesses saw any spools 
which would aid in the coiling of the wire and its removal from the 
property. 
The evidence produced at trial clearly shows that the Defendant 
acted under an honest, although mistaken, claim of right. ·ttis 
actions were instruct conformance with his stated declarations. 
Under the law, this is sufficient to raise a strict presumption 
of no criminal intent. The State has the burden, to rebut this 
presumption with evidence which tends to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant did in fact have the intent to steal ~t 
the time he committed the act. The evidence produced at trial 
clearly fails to carry this burden. In spite of this evidence, 
the Defendant was convicted. Thus the Court's failure to charge 
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the jury, to the effect that a finding of an honest but mistaken 
· belief of fact would be a total defense to the crime, severely 
prejudiced the Defendant. The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
held that when an error exists on the record which is so blatantly 
erroneous that its effect is to prevent the jury from giving a 
fair and impartial determination of the facts, the Supreme Court 
may take notice of such errors. The Court may notice such error 
even though it was not excepted to at trial. In fact, the Court 
has stated that it is its duty to take notice of such error; State 
v. Cobo, supra. 
Here, the Defendant's case was prejudiced by the Court's failure 
to so charge the jury. The Court's failure to so charge the jury 
that an honest b~lief to claim of right to obtain or exercise 
control over the property, even though mistakenly held, would have 
constituted an absolute defense to the crime of theft, allowed the 
jury to convict the Defendant on less than the requisite statutory 
intent. Before a conviction for th_eft may be sustained, the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did act 
with the requisite felonious intent at the time of the taking. Here, 
the State has failed to carry that burden. Thus the jury's con-
viction is clearly erroneous and worked a blatant prejudice on the 
rights and liberties of the Defendant, Dennis D. Kazda. Thus,-
under the authority of State v. Cobo, supra and State v. Peterson, 
supra, this Court has a duty to notice that error and to correct 
it even though no exception was taken thereto at trial. The Trial 
Court should have instructed the jury that an honest but mistaken 
belief in fact constituted an absolute defense under the statute. 
The Court should have instructed ~he jury further that if they 
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believed the Defendant was acting under an honest, even though 
totally unreasonable mistake of fact, that he could not have been 
guilty of theft because he did not have the necessary criminal 
intent. Therefore, the Defendant has been highly prejudiced 
and this Court should note this error and correct it by reversing 
the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT RECKLESS INTENT WOULD BE 
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT UNDER 76-4-404, ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT 
ON LESS THAN A REASONABLE DOUBT OF A CONSCIENCE OBJECT TO DEPRIVE 
THE OWNER OF ITS PROPERTY. 
The Court charged the jury as follows concerning the intent 
element of the crime: 
"For the purposes of this case, the terms used in the 
Court instructions are defined as follows: 
, ,1. Intentionally means that with respect to the nature 
of the Defendants conduct or a result of his 
conduct, it was the Defendants conscience objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
2. Knowingly means that with respect to Defendants 
conduct or circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or 
the existing circumstances. That is, a person acts 
knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware his conduct is reasonably certain 
to deprive the owner of the property. 
3. Reckless intent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding ones conduct means conduct which a 
person is aware of but consciencely disregards that 
a substantial risk that a persons property will be 
taken. 
4. Obtain or exercise unauthorized control means the 
unlawful use of the PToperty which would deprive 
the owner of a substantial portion of its economical 
value or of the use and benefits thereof, a.'1d if 
not limited to a taking and carrying away." 
Defense counsel did, at trial, take exception to the court's 
instructions regarding intent. (T 219). 
stating: 
Defense counsel excepted 
I 
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"In every crime or public offense, there must be a 
union of the act and the intent. In the crime of 
theft, the element of intent must be that conscience 
intent to deprive the owner of his property. The 
intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances 
connected with the offense and the sound mind and 
discretion of the accused." 
All presumptions of law, ir.dependent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a man is presumed to be innocent 
until he is.proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether this defendant, 
Dennis Kazda, had the conscience intent to deprive Mountain 
Bell Telephone Company of its wires, he is entitled to a 
verdict of not guilty." 
It is our contention on appeal that the Court's failure to 
instruct the jury, as requested by the Defendant, was extremely 
prejudicial in that it allowed the jury to convict on a finding 
of reckless disregard for the rights and property of another 
rather than upon finding of a conscience object to deprive the 
owner of his property. 
Defendant Kazda was charged with the crime of theft under 
u.c.A. 76-6-404. This section provides as follows: 
"A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises un-
authorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof." 
In order to convict under this statute the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Dennis Kazda, did in 
fact cut and remove Mountain Bell's telephone wires with a con-
science object or felonious intent to steal and therefore deprive 
Mountain Bell of its property. A necessary element of this 
crime is the felonious taking. The Defendant must have had the 
intent to steal at the time in which he was taking the property 
in order to sustain the conviction under this statute. 
Where the State fails to prove the necessary intent to steal 
a conviction under this statute must be reversed. Peoole v. Miller, 
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4 Utah 410, 11 P. 514; State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84; 
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952; State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 
229, 240 P. 2d 504; People v. Devine, 55 Cal. 227, 30 P. 378: 
People v. Butler, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 421 P. 2d 703 and Stanley v. 
State, 69 P. 2d 398 (Okl.} • 
. In State v. Cobo, supra, the Defendant was tried and convicted: 
of voluntary manslaughter. 
The Court noted that under the Utah statutes which at that 
. time was 103-28-5 R.S. Utah 1933 that to constitute voluntary 
manslaughter the killing must be with an intention to do great 
bodily harm. The Court stated: 
"Our statute was copied from California, and in that 
state it has been held that in order to constitute 
voluntary manslaughter t..~e intent to kill must exist, 
a killing without malice or intent to kill, in the 
commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a 
felony constitutes involuntary manslaughter." 
The Trial Court charged the jury as follows: 
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, as charged in the information, you must 
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the following 
elements: 
(1) That Frank G. McIntyre was killed on or about the 
18th day of May, 1933, at Juab County, State of 
Utah. 
(2) That said killing was the direct result of Frank 
G. McIntyre being beaten on, over, in or upon the 
face by Defendant Pete Cobo, with some means 
unknown, instruments or weapons. 
(3) That the killing by said Pete Cobo, if you believe 
he killed said Frank G. McIntyre, was upon the 
sudden quarrel or in a heat of passion. 
It is not enough that one or more of these elements be 
proven to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but all of said elements _must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt before you can find the Defendant guilty 
of murder (the Court regarded the charge of guilty of 
murder as simply a slip of-the-tongue which did not affect 
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the jury), in the first-degree, as charged in the information." 
The Supreme Court noted that the elements of the crime con-
stituting voluntary manslaughter involved a willful or intentional 
killing or the willful or intentional infliction of great bodily 
harm resulting in death. The Court examined the record and found 
no evidence which would indicate an intent to kill. The Court 
then stated: 
"As is seen, the charge wholly eliminated that essential 
and dominant element of voluntary manslaughter. In other 
words, to convict the Defendant of voluntary manslaughter, 
the offense for which the Defendant was convicted, the jury 
were permitted by the charge to do so without finding that 
the killing was either willful or intentional, thus 
misdirecting the jury with respect to the elements of the 
offense for which the accused was convicted. 
That such error was manifest and of necessity resulted to 
the prejudice of the accused and deprived him of a fair 
trial cannot well be doubted." 
The Court therefore granted the reversal and a new trial to 
the Defendant. 
Here, defendant Kazda was convicted as charged of theft of 
copper wire. Under the Utah statute an essential element of theft 
is the intentional stealing or the conscience object of depriving 
the owner of his property. When the Court charged the jury 
concerning reckless intent which is the wanton disregard of the 
rights of others in the property, it in effect allowed the jury 
to convict the Defendant on less than the required felonious intent. 
Defendant Kazda was reckless in the sense that he did not 
take the trouble to ascertain the validity of his contract. He 
!:lad a writing in his hand which he assumed was valid. He neither 
asked nor did Mr •. Johnson furnish any proof of employment or 
proof of authority to b2 contracting in the name of Mountain Bell. 
A man of reasonable in~elligence and education should have questioned 
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both the validity of the contract itself and of the• authority 
of Mr. Johnson to contract for Mountain Bell. However, defendant 
Kazda is not a man of average education. He testified the extent 
of his formal education as an eleventh grade level. He dropped 
out of high school and did not receive a diploma. At the age of 
nineteen, he was convicted of a felony and spent nine and 1/2 
years in the Utah State Penitentiary. Certainly whatever education 
he received while in the State Penitentiary was not in contract 
formation. 
However, the Court's charge to the jury on reckless intent 
would allow the jury to convict for the offense charged without 
ever having found felonious intent as is required under the 
statute. The jury, under the charge of the Court could reasonably 
have found Defendant Kazda to have been reckless in the fact that 
he did not ascertain the validity of the contract and therefore 
convicted him for this reckless behavior and not because of the 
conscience objective to deprive Mountain Bell of their property. 
Under 76-6-404, to convict for theft, there must be proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had the intent to 
deprive·the owners of their property, at the time of the taking .. 
Nowhere does the statute mention that reckless intent· will be suf-
ficient to sustain a conviction under this statute. Therefore, 
the Court's charge allowed the jury to convict on less evidence 
than is required, thus creqting a manifest injustice to defendant 
Kazda in that he was convicted on less than proven intent to steal. 
THEREFORE, Appellant maintains that the Trial Court erred 
in its charge to the jury and its conviction of the Defendant under 
this erroneous charge has worked a gross miscarriage of justice 
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which must be remedied by this Court. This Court should reverse 
the conviction and remend for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Steven E. Clyde· ./ 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
